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JUSTICE GINSBURG, CIVIL PROCEDURE PROFESSOR AND 
CHAMPION OF JUDICIAL FEDERALISM 
 
Rodger D. Citron* 
Before she was “Notorious RBG” – even before she was Judge 
Ginsburg on the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit – 
she was Professor Ginsburg.  Before Ruth Bader Ginsburg became a 
federal judge, she was a professor at Rutgers University Law School 
then at Columbia Law School.  She taught, among other things, Civil 
Procedure.1 
While Justice Ginsburg generally was an excellent writer, her 
Civil Procedure decisions were especially superb.  In the casebook we 
use at Touro, she is the author of critical decisions on general personal 
jurisdiction,2 removal,3 claim preclusion4 and settlement of class 
actions.5  Her dissent in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro6 
illustrates the challenge posed by the Roberts Court, with its emphasis 
on the primacy of state boundary lines, to the Court’s approach to 
specific personal jurisdiction set out in International Shoe Co v. 
Washington.7  Similarly, her dissent in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes8 
must be taught along with the Court’s majority opinion in that case to 
 
* Rodger D. Citron is Associate Dean for Research and Scholarship and Professor of 
Law at Touro College, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center.  
1 See In Memoriam: Ruth Bader Ginsburg ʼ59, COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL (Sept. 18, 
2020), https://www.law.columbia.edu/news/archive/memoriam-ruth-bader-
ginsburg-59; Stanford Law Faculty on Justice Ruth Bader; Ginsburg's Legacy, 
STANFORD LAW SCHOOL (Sept. 18, 2020), 
https://law.stanford.edu/2020/09/18/stanford-law-faculty-on-justice-ruth-bader-
ginsburgs-legacy. 
2 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, 
S.A., v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011). 
3 Caterpillar v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61 (1996). 
4 Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 (2008). 
5 Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997). 
6 564 U.S. 873, 893-910 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
7 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
8 564 U.S. 338 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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properly teach the Court’s approach for certifying a class action under 
Rule 23.9 
To elaborate on just one example: Removal is a challenging 
subject, one that strikes fear in litigators who practice in state rather 
than federal court because of the statutory deadlines that limit the 
availability of removal.  A professor must review the relevant statutes 
– in particular 28 U.S.C. sections 1441, 1446, and 1447 – when 
covering the material.  Justice Ginsburg’s decision in Caterpillar10 
makes everyone’s job easier because she provides such a clear 
explanation of the statutes as she walks the reader through the 
procedural history of the case.  And while she acknowledges the 
argument in favor of a different conclusion, Justice Ginsburg makes 
such a persuasive case for her view that it’s hard to disagree with her 
judgment.  None of the justices disagreed with her – the Court’s 
decision in Caterpillar was unanimous. 
Over the years teaching Civil Procedure, I have come to 
appreciate another aspect of Justice Ginsburg’s jurisprudence:  her 
respect for the competence and integrity of state judicial systems.  This 
is evident in her dissents in the Court’s decisions authorizing judicial 
review of punitive damages awards made by juries in cases litigated in 
state courts.11  It also is evident in her dissent in a case involving the 
Erie doctrine in Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. 
Co.12  Even her powerful dissent in Nicastro13 can be read as an 
endorsement of a state court forum compared to its federal counterpart. 
During Justice Ginsburg’s tenure on the Supreme Court, the 
process for the President nominating and the Senate confirming a 
justice for the Court became increasingly contentious, even frenzied at 
times.  Almost certainly, the next time there is a vacancy there will be 
a political furor.  Before the uproar begins, may I suggest that we not 
lose sight of the need for a Civil Procedure justice on the Court? 
 
9 Id. at 367-78 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
10 Caterpillar v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61 (1996). 
11 See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 430-39 (2003) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
12 559 U.S. 393, 436-59 (2010) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
13 J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 893-910 (2011) (Ginsburg, 
J., dissenting). 
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